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Parashes: OSHA Noise Standard

A LEGAL OVERVIEW OF THE OSHA
NOISE STANDARD
PETER

S

T.

PARASHEs*

27, 1971, when it became effective, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) regulation concerning
noise levels has been the source of considerable controversy and confusion.
The noise standard, as it is frequently called, provides:
When employees are subjected to sound levels exceeding those listed
in Table G-16, feasible administrative or engineering controls shall be
utilized. If such controls fail to reduce sound levels within the levels of
Table G-16, personal protective equipment shall be provided and used
to reduce sound levels within the levels of the Table.'
INCE AUGUST

The law concerning the noise standard is itself far from settled. The multitude of decisions from the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission) and administrative law judges have left many
questions unanswered and have allowed substantial uncertainty to remain
regarding the interpretation and application of the standard
A virtually identical regulation also became effective on August 27,
1971. Unlike the Section 1910 regulations which are "general industry"
standards, Section 1926 standards are directed to the construction industry.
* Associate with White and Williams, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; former staff attorney with
the United States Department of Labor, Regional Solicitor's Office; Pennsylvania and New
Jersey bars; A.B., Bowdoin College; J.D., Temple University Law School. The views expressed
in this article are those of the author, and not necessarily those of his previous employer,
the United States Department of Labor.
1 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(b)(1) (1977). The regulation permits the following sound levels:
TABLE G-16-PERMISSIBLE NOISE EXPOSURE
Sound Level dBA
(adjusted decibels)
Duration per Day,
Slow Response
Hours
90
8
92
6
95
4
97
3
100
2
102
11A
105
1
110
or less

115

Id.
decisions of administrative law judges will not be discussed because they do not constitute binding precedent before the Commission. See Secretary of Labor v. Leone Construction Co., OSAHRC Docket No. 4090, 3 0cc. SAF. & HEALTH CAs. (BNA) 1797, [19751976] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEc. (CCH) %20,387 (February 10, 1976).
2The
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The highest incidence of noise violations has been in a number of industries
covered by Section 1910 regulations, as reflected by the statistics issued by
OSHA on March 10, 1977.' Accordingly, the bulk of the case law on noise
violations focuses on 29 C.F.R. Section 1910.95(b) (1). This article focuses
on that standard as the most significant concerning noise.
There have been recent changes in the makeup of the Commission
which could result in the alteration of some major prior decisions.
The Commission is composed of three Commissioners, one of whom also
acts as the Chairman. At the time of many of the more important decisions,
the Commission was composed of Chairman Barnako and Commissioners Cleary and Moran. In April of 1977, Commissioner
Moran's term expired. On August 31, 1977, President Carter named then
Commissioner Cleary as Chairman and former Chairman Barnako remained as a Commissioner.' In April of 1978,1 Bertram R. Cottine, a former
assistant for policy to Undersecretary of Labor for OSHA, Eula Bingham,
was confirmed as the new Commissioner.' These changes may lead to a
reconsideration of many of the guidelines that had been established by the
previous Commission. Commissioners Cleary and Barnako have generally
taken opposing views in interpreting the noise standard. The new Com3

The industries most frequently cited for noise during 1976 are as follows:
Industry

Number of
Violations

100
Sawmills and Planing Mills -----------------------.-.-------........................

66
Rubber Footwear ...........................................................
61
..............
.........................................
Gray Iron Foundries .................
38
Bottled and Canned Soft Drinks and Carbonated Water ..............................
. 37
Metal Stampings ...........................................................
33
Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories ............................................
29
.....
Fabricated Plate Work ................................
27
Miscellaneous Plastics .......................................................
26
.................................
....
Blast Furnaces ...............................................
Wood Household Furniture ...... .........

............ 25

25
Footwear, except Rubber ......................................................
25
Fabricated Structural Steel ....................................................
23
W ood M iscellaneous .........................................................
. 20
Fabricated Rubber Products ...................................................
19
...............................................................
Paper M ills
19
Metal Cans ...............................................................
18
Millwork, Veneer, Plywood, and Prefabricated Structural Wood Products ........

. 17
........................................
M eat Packing Plants ...............................................
17
...........
Electroplating, Plating, Polishing ..........

17
Fabricated M etal Products ....................................................
10,832 (March 10, 1977).
[1977, New Developments] E.S.H.G. (CCH)
'See E.S.H.G. (CCH), numbers 330 and 331, September 6, 1977 and September 13, 1977
for the announcements.
The public announcement of Mr. Cottine's confirmation was made on May 2, 1978.
eSee E.S.H.G. (CCH) numbers 331 and 334, September 13, 1977, and October 4, 1977
for further details regarding Mr. Cottine's background.
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missioner Cottine holds the swing vote if and when disagreement between
the two occurs. It is highly probable that many of the more important
cases in which Commissioners Cleary and Bamako opposed each other will
now be reconsidered with the addition of Mr. Cottine.
Two major difficulties that have arisen in applying the noise standard are:
(1) what constitutes adequate proof that a violation has occurred and (2)
what meaning is to be attached to the word "feasible." This article will center on these two areas in order to impart a basic understanding of Commission law regarding the noise standard and some insight into the areas
in which change is most likely to occur.
I. PROOF OF EXCESSIVE NOISE: WHAT DATA MUST BE ADDUCED TO
PROVE A VIOLATION OF THE NOISE STANDARD

An initial problem posed by the noise standard is the type of proof
that will suffice to prove a violation of the noise levels allowed by the noise
standard in Table G-16. As the Commission noted in Secretary of Labor v.
Weyerhaeuser Co.' the standard itself provides two ways in which the Secretary of Labor (Labor) may establish a violation. The exposure of an employee
for an interval of eight hours at noise levels of more than 90 dBA 8 is one
way to establish a violation. The other means of establishing a violation is
to prove exposure for any shorter interval set forth within Table G-16 at
levels exceeding those specified for the interval. In the latter case, it is
not significant that the exposure may have been sporadic or continuous,
or that previous or subsequent exposures were at 90 dBA or less.
The only question is what the exposure was for the one interval in
issue. For example, proof that an employee was exposed to 100 dBA during
a three hour interval establishes a violation even though his exposure level
may have been less than the permissible 100 dBA level during the first
two hours of the interval. Similarly, the exposure of an employee to noise
during the various time intervals of an eight hour work shift may not be
violative as to any one time interval, yet be violative of the 90 dBA limit
for the eight hour day. Violations can be established in these situations
because Table G-16 specifically requires the cumulation of exposure levels

I OSAHRC Docket Nos. 2116 and 2250, 2 Occ. SAF. & HEALTH CAs. (BNA) 1152, [1977]
18,468 (August 15, 1974).
E.S.H.G. (CCH)
8 See note 2 supra.
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when an employee is exposed to two or more periods of noise at different
levels.'
A further difficulty posed by the noise standard is the type of sampling
data sufficient to prove a violation of the Table G-16 limits. A practical
problem is presented by the prospect of a compliance officer being required
to monitor individual employees with a sound level meter for eight hours
in order to obtain sufficient proof of the existence of 90 or 92 dBA levels

over eight hours. The Commission has consistently held that spot readings
or "grab" samples are sufficient to prove the existence of excessive noise
when presented along with other evidence showing that employees were
exposed to the levels reflected in those samples for periods exceeding the
relevant Table G-16 limits.1" A brief review of pertinent Commission dec-

isions is illuminating in this regard.
In Weyerhaeuser, the citation alleged exposure to 97 dBA for a
period exceeding three hours.1 The evidence consisted of spot readings of
9

The explanation accompanying Table G-16 instructs as follows:
when the daily noise exposure is composed of two or more periods of noise exposure
of different levels, their combined effect should be considered, rather than the individual
effect of each. If the sum of the following fractions: C1/T 2 + C,/T 2 C./T. exceeds
unity, then, the mixed exposure should be considered to exceed the limit value. C. indicates the total time of exposure at a specified noise level, and T. indicates the total time
of exposure permitted at the level.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(b)(3) (1977), n.1.
The following hypothetical table set forth in Weyerhaeuser illustrates this principle:
Permitted Duration
Sound Level
Hours of Actual
of Exposure
dBA Slow Response
Exposure
%
110
105
1
8
90
6
4
95
1
(Less than 8 hrs.)
(Exceeds 90 dBA)
(8 hrs. total)
Note that at no interval does the sound level violate the standard. However, using the cumulation procedure set out by the noise standard a violation occurs as to the total eight hour
period:
3 + .2
-;_+-T + T6 +- 1-4 1
The violation is established by the figure 2h because it is greater than the figure 1, which
represents unity.
20 Secretary of Labor v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., OSAHRC Docket No. 10639, 5 0cc.
22,261
SA. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) 1994, [1977-78] Occ. SAP. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH)
(October 19, 1977); Secretary of Labor v. Reynolds Metals Co., OSAHRC Docket No. 1551,
3 0cc. SAF. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) 2051, [1975-1976] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH)
1 20,447 (February 25, 1976); Secretary of Labor v. WPR Lumber Corp., OSAHRC Docket
No. 4612, 3 0cc. SAP. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) 1815, [1976-1977] Occ. SAP. & HEALTH DEC.
(CCH) 1 20,892 (December 16, 1975); Secretary of Labor v. Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock
Co., OSAHRC Docket No. 268, 2 Occ. SAP. & HEALTH CAs. (BNA) 118, [1977] E.S.H.G.
18,537 (August 28, 1974); Weyerhaeuser, 2 0cc. SAP. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) 1152.
(CCH)
12 0cc. SAP. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) 1152.
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97 and 102 dBA taken by the compliance officer while holding the sound
level meter "sometimes close" to the ears of the exposed employee for a
period totaling fifteen to twenty minutes. There was testimony from the
employee that the machine emitting the noise, a corrugator single facer, was
running normally on the day of the inspection. Moreover, the compliance
officer testified that plant officials told him during the inspection that the
work operation was normal on that day. However, the compliance officer
admitted on cross-examination that the company officials never defined what
they meant by the term "normal" with respect to noise. 2 When called to
testify, the -plant manager stated that fluctuations in the noise level were
normal. The exposed employee testified that the variety of normal fluctuations was such that the compliance officer might not have been able to
record some of the noise levels in his fifteen to twenty minute sampling."3
In light of this, the Commission held that Labor did not establish by a
preponderance of the evidence"4 that the employee was exposed to 97 dBA
for more than three hours. 5
In Secretary of Labor v. Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Co.,' the
Commission reviewed a decision of an administrative law judge that vacated
in toto a citation alleging four violations of the noise standard. The evidence
that there was excessive noise was reconsidered as to items 1, 3, and 4,
Labor having conceded in its brief that item 2 was properly vacated below.
Items 3 and 4 were affirmed and item 1 reversed. Item 4 will not be considered herein since all three Commissioners (VanNamee,' Cleary, and
Moran) differed in their view as to how the facts pertaining to that item
should have been weighed in determining if a violation had been proven. 8
Item 3 alleged a violation based upon the exposure of a welder to noise
levels of 112 to 133 dBA.'9 The evidence showed that the welder was oper'uld. at 1153.
is d. at 1154.
t,Labor must prove each element of a violation by a preponderance of the credible evidence.
Secretary of Labor v. Armor Elevator, Inc., OSAHRC Docket Nos. 425 and 426, 1 0cc. SAP. &
HEA.TH CAs. (BNA) 1409, [1973-1974] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH)
16,958
(November 20, 1973).
152 Occ. SAP. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) at 1154.
162 Occ. SAP. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) at 1181.
ITCommissioner VanNamee was replaced by Commissioner Barnako following the expiration of his term on April 27, 1975.
8
2 In order for a Commission rule or principle on an issue to be established with precedential
weight, at least two commissioners must be in accord on the points involved. Shaw Construction, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 534 F.2d 1183 (5th

Cir. 1976); Secretary of Labor v. Garcia Concrete, Inc., OSAHRC Docket No. 2591, 3 Occ.
SAP. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) 1121, [1974-1975]
19,688 (May 27, 1975).
292 Occ. SAF. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) at 1181.
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ating a pneumatic chipping tool in the fabrication shop of the respondent's
shipyard when the inspector took two grab samples of about thirty seconds
each near the ears of the employee to determine the noise level of the
chipper. Those readings registered 112 and 113 dBA. The compliance officer
also took an unspecified number of spot readings for background noise
which showed the background levels to be from 104 to 106 dBA. The welder
testified that he did not know how long he had been operating the chipper
at the time the compliance officer arrived. However, there was evidence
that he had roughed 180 lineal feet of hull plate with the chipper on the
day of the inspection; he guessed that it would have taken him five to ten
minutes for each forty lineal feet of plate, or a total of twenty-two and
one-half to forty-five minutes for that day's chipping operation. Another
witness testified that the exposed employee had not spent more than five
minutes operating the chipper on the day in question."0
In reviewing this evidence, Commissioner VanNamee, who wrote the
lead opinion, noted through interpolation21 that exposure to 112 dBA would
be permitted for approximately twenty-two minutes under the standard and
exposure to 113 dBA would be permitted for approximately eighteen minutes.2 2 However, he considered the most conservative twenty-two and onehalf minute exposure period estimated by the welder to be an insufficient
basis for inferring overexposure because it was based on guesswork." He
thereby concluded, with the concurrence of Commissioner Cleary, that the
burden of proof was not carried as to this element and that item 3 should
be vacated.
The evidence involving item I supported the opposite conclusion, however. That item alleged that an employee operating a pneumatic chipping tool
was exposed to 117 dBA for two hours and twenty minutes.2 ' The supporting evidence included three thirty second grab samples reading 116,
117, and 120 dBA taken by the compliance officer in the vicinity of the
employee's ears while the employee was operating the chipper.", There
was also evidence, apparently developed through the testimony of the
employee in question, that the employee had been almost continually operId.
Interpolation is the mathematical process used to calculate the allowable exposure period
for intermediate sound levels not specifically set out in Table G-16. The Commission has
approved of this practice and has allowed violations to be based upon interpolated exposures.
Id. at 1185.
22 Id. at 1183.
23 Id. at 1184.
26 Id. at 1183.
20

21

25 Id.
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ating his chipper for one and one-half to two hours prior to the arrival of
the compliance officer and that a co-worker was engaged in the same operation nearby at the same time.2" On this basis, Commissioner VanNamee,
with the concurrence of Commissioner Cleary, held that it was reasonable
to infer that the chipper operator was exposed to 115 dBA for more than
fifteen minutes and that the administrative law judge had erred in vacating
2
the item.
2 8 proThe case of Secretary of Labor v. WPR Lumber Corporation,
vides another good illustration of the use of indirect proof in establishing
employee exposure to excessive noise. In that case, the evidence showed
that the compliance officer took sound readings for forty minutes in the
vicinity of a planer foreman working in the lumber mill.29 The readings
showed noise levels exceeding 105 dBA. After completing the sampling,
the compliance officer left the immediate area where the planer foreman was
working and went "across the street""0 to his car, from which he further observed the employee, thereby increasing his total observations to more than
one hour. The compliance officer pointed out in his testimony that the location of the employee at the time he observed him from the automobile continued to be in the mill areas near the planer machine where the noise
readings had exceeded 105 dBA. The Commission's decision notes the
testimony of only one witness for Respondent who attempted to contradict
the compliance officer; that witness testified merely that he would be very
surprised if the planer foreman spent one hour in the immediate vicinity
of the planer machine during a single work day. 81 After summarizing this
evidence, Commissioner Barnako, who wrote the majority opinion over
the dissent of former Commissioner Moran, concluded that exposure to
noise levels of 105 dBA or more for a period exceeding the one hour allowed under Table G-16 was established by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 Accordingly, the administrative law judge's decision in favor of
Labor was affirmed.

In Secretary of Labor v. Louisiana-Pacific Corporation,"" the Commission considered the propriety of indirect data which included noise

readings taken almost four months after the compliance officer's inspection.
26 Id.
2

7The Commission also held, however, that the item was "other" in classification, not

"serious" as originally cited. Id.
28 3Occ. SAP. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA)

1815.

29/d. at 1816.
80

Id.

81 Id.

"Id.
885

Occ. SAP. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA)

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1979

1994.

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 12 [1979], Iss. 1, Art. 7
AKRoN LAw Rvmw

[Vol. 12: 1.

In that case a compliance officer conducted an inspection of a lumber mill
on September 17, 19742 ° He took two noise readings of fourteen to sixteen minutes each, showing a range of 114 to 122 dBA, while closely following a chipper operator through the areas in which he worked. 5 The chipper
machine, which was the major noise source for its operator, was in operation for more than seven hours of the operator's shift on the day of the
inspection. These facts were entered into evidence, primarily through the
testimony of the compliance officer, in support of the allegation that noise
levels exceeded Table G-16 limits." However, Labor's case also included
evidence from a January 15, 1975, noise survey"7 conducted by a consultant
retained by Labor to assess the noise conditions in terms of the feasibility
of noise controls. 8 The consultant took five noise readings of fifteen to
twenty minutes each, one reading being obtained at each of the five locations where the chipper operator worked." His readings varied from 100
to 115 dBA. This evidence was offered not only as it related to the proof
of feasibility, but also in support of the allegation that noise levels were
excessive.'"
The administrative law judge held that the consultant's testimony regarding his readings on January 15, 1975, was not relevant to the September
17, 1974, inspection. Labor was therefore required to amend the date of
the violation to state September 17, 1974, and January 15, 1975. The
testimony was then admitted along with that of the compliance officer.
Accordingly the administrative law judge found that a violation had been
established. On review, the Commission, consisting only of Commissioners
Cleary and Barnako, affirmed the violation finding that on the basis of the
compliance officer's testimony alone it could be reasonably inferred that the
low readings of 114 dBA taken over fourteen to sixteen minutes were representative of a condition that persisted for the nineteen minute period required for a violation to be found under Table G-16." Moreover, both
34 Id. at 1995.
35

Id. at 2000.

$6 Id.

s7 Post inspection monitoring visits may be sought by Labor under FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
Such visits will often enable an expert consultant retained by Labor to sample noise and examine noise sources for the purpose of determining which engineering or administrative controls can feasibly be utilized to attenuate the noise. The Commission has held that such post

inspection monitoring visits are ordinarily permissible for that purpose even if the information
sought could have been obtained at
Brewing Co., OSAHRC Docket No.
[1976-1977] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH CAS.
s 5 0cc. SAF. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA)

the original inspection. Secretary of Labor v. Pabst
13068, 4 0cc. SAF. & HEA.TH CAS. (BNA) 2003,

(CCH) 1121,472 (January 17, 1977).
at 2000.

3

9 ld. at 1996.
'6 I1d.
411 Id.
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Commissioners held that the administrative law judge erred in granting
the amendment which added the date of the consultant's visit to the citation,
and pointed out that such an amendment was not necessary for the admission of the consultant's findings into evidence. " Commissioner Cleary
found that the consultant's findings were admissible to confirm the first
sound level readings taken by the compliance officer and to establish the
feasibility of controls. Commissioner Barnako found the consultant's findings admissible only on the question of feasibility. No confirmation of the
excessive levels found at the time of the original inspection was necessary
since Commissioner Bamako thought the compliance officer's readings
were fully sufficient in that regard. " Thus, Louisiana-Pacificnot only serves
as an illustration of how the Commission will infer excessive noise levels
from limited samplings, but it also shows that the Commission may allow
consulting surveys, primarily undertaken to establish feasibility, to be used
as proof of excessive noise levels.
II.

FEASIBLE NOISE CONTROLS: THE COMMISSION STANDARDS

Once it has been established that noise levels exceed Table G- 16 limits,
two important issues remain: (1) the feasibility of noise reduction by
engineering or administrative controls, and (2) the extent and means by
which the company must reduce the noise when it is feasible to do so.
The case of Secretary of Labor v. Continental Can Company" is
probably cited more often than any other on what "feasibility" means in the
context of the noise standard. It is indeed a most significant and precedent
setting decision. The case involved a number of plants of a manufacturer
of metal cans, the Continental Can Company. Citations were issued by
Labor alleging that Continental Can failed to institute feasible engineering
controls to reduce noise levels to Table G-16 limits, in violation of 29
C.F.R. Section 1910.95(b) (1). The parties stipulated that the noise levels
were excessive, that the exposed employees wore personal protective equipment which reduced their noise exposure to levels allowed under Table G-16,
and that noise reduction could be achieved by engineering means. " The
parties strongly disputed what was meant by "feasible."
The case was heard by the Commission on the application of Labor,
following the vacation of the noise citations by Administrative Law Judge
42 Id. at 1996, 2002.

,3 Id. at 1998, 2002.
44 OSAHRC Docket Nos. 3973, 4397, 4501, 4853, 5327, 7122, 7910, and 7920, 30cc. S.
& HEALTH CAs. (BNA) 1797, [1976-1977] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1121,009
(August 24, 1976).

&OId. at 1542.
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Robert N. Burchmore."I The Commission first considered Continental Can's
argument that engineering and administrative" noise controls were unfeasible per se unless they would reduce the noise levels to limits allowed
by Table G-16 without the supplemental use of personal protective equipment. 8 Continental Can pointed out in support of this argument that its
employees were being exposed to noise levels below the Table G-16 limits
by virtue of the enforced use of personal protective equipment and that
currently available engineering controls would not reduce the levels sufficiently to obviate the need for the personal protective equipment in all
locations."9 Therefore, the argument continued, the controls could not be
feasible in that they would require the expenditure of a large sum of
money without a material change in the working conditions for many
employees."
In his lead opinion, Chairman Barnako, with the concurrence of Commissioner Cleary,51 rejected Continental Can's argument on two grounds.
First, he found that the noise standard contemplates the use of engineering
or administrative controls even when they fail to reduce noise to Table G-16
limits without the supplemental use of personal protective equipment.5 2 He
then pointed out that 29 C.F.R. Section 1910.95(b)(1) first requires that feasible administrative or engineering controls be implemented. Personal protective
equipment is only to be used to reduce sound levels if such controls fail."
In support of this holding Chairman Bamako presented a number of
rationales: (1) Personal protective equipment by itself presents the shortcomings of frequent nonuse by some recalcitrant employees, improper
do Judge Burchmore based his decision on a finding that the noise standard was invalid.
Continental Can Co., 3 Occ. SAF. & HEALTH CAs. (BNA) at 1592. However, he based
that finding on the interpretation of the standard proposed by the Secretary of Labor that
economics enter into an assessment of feasibility only when the contemplated controls would
"seriously jeopardize the financial condition of the company."
4T It should be noted that the noise standard itself differentiates personal protective equipment
(earmuffs, plugs, etc.) from engineering and administrative controls by virtue of its allowance
of personal protective equipment when engineering and administrative controls fail to reduce
the noise to Table G-16 limits. See Secretary of Labor v. Anchor-Hocking Corp., OSAHRC
Docket No. 3783, 3 Occ. SAF. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) 1389, (1974-19751 0cC. SAF. & HEALTH
DEc. (CCH) 119,854 (July 22, 1975). The United States Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration's "Field Operations Manual," which provides guidelines to OSHA personnel, also specifically rejects personal protective equipment as a form
of administrative control. (ch. 1, para. N). See [1977] E.S.H.G. (CCH) 1 4483.80.
48 3 Occ. SAF. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA)

at 1544.

49 Id. at 1545.
o Id.

51 Commissioner Moran dissented on this specific issue, while Commissioner Cleary concurred.

52 The Commission held that this was the proper interpretation of the standard in Secretary
of Labor v. Anchor-Hocking Corp. 3 Occ. SAF. & HEALTH CAs. (BNA)
63 Occ, SAP. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) at 1545.
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fittings in other cases and that for the nonuser and the improperly fitted
user, a real benefit is only provided by a significant noise reduction accomplished through engineering and administrative means; (2) A reduction
in noise levels which is not great enough to meet Table G-16 limits without

personal protective equipment may still allow employees to set their earmuffs or ear plugs aside for part of the work day by virtue of the longer
period of exposure which would be allowed under Table G-16 to the lower
noise level; (3) It is often necessary to implement some engineering controls, with only a partial noise reduction,"4 before it can be determined if

further controls are feasible. It would be unrealistic to require a determination that a full reduction of noise to permissible limits is feasible before any
controls can be required. For these reasons, Continental Can's first argument

regarding the interpretation of "feasible" was rejected."5
The second, and more significant point of the controversy, concerned
the applicability of economic factors to a determination of feasibility. Labor
argued that economic factors should be considered only if the cost of
implementing otherwise feasible engineering and administrative controls
would "seriously jeopardize the financial health of the company." Even

then the economic factors should be considered only in fashioning an
abatement schedule. 6 Continental Can argued that Labor's burden of
proving feasibility extends to economic as well as technical factors, and
that a desirable cost-benefit ratio must be shown before controls can be
required.' Continental Can presented evidence showing that it would cost
$33 million to reduce noise at its seventy-nine metal division plants 8
3,Commissioner Barnako pointed out in a footnote that he considered a reduction of 3 dBA
"clearly significant." Id. at 1544.
55 Id.
56 OSHA's "Field Operations Manual" outlines the approach to be taken by OSHA personnel

faced with economic issues bearing on noise reduction as follows:
The employer's economic cost of abatement will not be considered to be a factor in
the issuance of a citation. However, if the cost of utilization of effective engineering or
administrative controls, or combination, which would bring the employer into compliance
with permissible exposure limits would so seriously jeopardize his financial condition as
to result in the probable shutdown of his establishment or a substantial part, then only
a personal protective equipment program would be required in the interim, and an extended abatement date should be granted to permit the extended implementation of
feasible engineering or administrative controls taking into account the employer's financial
condition. The burden of proof of economic infeasibility rests upon the employer. Any
abatement date based on economic grounds shall be approved by the Regional Administrator.
[1977] E.S.H.G. (CCH)
4483.80.
5T 3 Occ. SA s. & HExLTH CAS. (BNA) at 1546.
58 The citations in issue at the original hearing before the administrative law judge pertained
to three plants. However, over the objection of Labor, Continental Can was allowed to
introduce evidence bearing on the cost of compliance at its metal plants throughout the
nation. The Commission deemed such evidence admissible in that it would allow for consideration to be given "economies of scale." Id. at 1548.
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through engineering means and that it would cost approximately $175,000
per year to maintain the controls." Continental Can juxtaposed these figures to a $100,000 per year figure for the maintenance of a program utilizing
personal protective equipment."
In considering the contentions of the parties, Chairman Barnako noted
that the legislative history and background of the noise standard did not
provide any insight.61 He did consider the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson 2 to be instructive. On the petition of a number of labor
unions, the court in Hodgson reviewed the propriety of certain aspects of
the OSHA asbestos standard.6" The significant aspect of the decision, from
the standpoint of the Continental Can ruling, is that the court found that
it would be proper for the Secretary of Labor in the process of promulgating
standards to consider the economic feasibility of compliance.6 ' After citing
Hodgson as sound authority on the issue, Chairman Barnako considered
the parties' arguments and the evidence on the issue of economics, and held
that the noise standard requires "those engineering and administrative controls which are economically, as well as technically, possible." 5 He went on
to state that controls which are "expensive and increase production costs"'
may nonetheless be economically feasible. The ultimate determination depends upon an analysis of "all the relevant cost and benefit factors," including
the magnitude of other hazards existing at the work place and the cost of
abating them.6 ' The burden of proving economic and technical feasibility
89 Id.
60d.

61 ld. at 1546.
62 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

6S

Id. at 477.

64 Chairman Barnako in his Continental Can decision cited this specific statement from
Hodgson:
There can be no question that OSHA represents a decision to require safeguards for
the health of employees even if such measures substantially increase production costs.
This is not, however, the same thing as saying that Congress intended to require immediate implementation of all protective measures technologically achievable without
regard for their economic impact. To the contrary, it would comport with common
usage to say that a standard that is prohibitively expensive is not feasible.
Id. at 1546, citing Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d, at 477.
65 3 0cc. SAF. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) at 1547.
66 Id.

67 In addition to consideration of the magnitude of other existing hazards and the cost of
abating those, Chairman Barnako made general reference to the following as appropriate
factors for consideration in the cost-benefit analysis, while emphasizing that the list was not
meant to be "all inclusive:"
BENEFITS
1. Number of employees exposed to the noise levels which the engineering or administrative controls could reduce;
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rests with Labor. 8 Since Labor took the position that economic factors
were irrelevant, and presented no evidence pertaining to economic feasibility,
the Commission affirmed the administrative law judge's decision vacating
the citations." ' The Commission did, however, emphasize that the decision
did not relieve Continental Can of its responsibility to "[implement] ...
whatever engineering or administrative controls may be feasible to reduce
the noise levels.... ."TO
Commissioner Cleary's lengthy dissenting opinion strongly opposed the

majority on the issue of economic feasibility. He argued that "economic
factors are properly considered only in fashioning an appropriate abatement
order."'7 The noise standard is a "technology-forcing" standard. In support
of his analysis Commissioner Cleary relied on Society of Plastics Industries,
Inc. v. OSHA," the Second Circuit Court of Appeals case in which the validity of the vinyl chloride standard at 29 C.F.R. Section 1910.1017 was upheld.
In Society of Plastics,the court considered, inter alia, whether the Secretary of
Labor exceeded his statutory authority by requiring employers to reduce the
exposure levels of their employees to vinyl chloride to one part per million

through engineering controls, when the attainment of that level was impossible with existing technology." In finding for Labor the court stated
that the Secretary "may raise standards which require improvements in exist2. Net reduction in the exposure of the aforesaid employees which the controls could
reasonably be expected to produce;
COSTS
1. Costs of installing controls;
2. Costs of maintaining controls;
3. Indirect costs resulting from decreased productivity or efficiency as a result of the
noise controls.
Id. at 1547-48.
" Id. at 1548.
" Id. at 1549.
T
Old. After this favorable decision, Continental Can moved for summary judgment
on the basis of collateral estoppel in the noise standard cases still pending against it. The
Commission decided that collateral estoppel was not applicable because Labor had not actively
litigated the issue of economic feasibility and was entitled to do so. They found in this
manner despite the fact that Continental Can had raised the feasibility issue and that it formed
the foundation for the Commission's decision. In the meantime, Labor continued to cite
Continental Can for noise violations. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois disagreed with the Commission and found that Labor was collaterally
estopped from prosecuting Continental Can. In addition the court found Labor's persistence
in citing Continental Can for noise violations to be harassment in violation of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process clause. Continental Can Co. v. Marshall, 455 F. Supp. 1015
(S.D.Ill. 1978).
1"3 Occ. SAF. & HEALTH CAs. (BNA) at 1549.
T2 Id. at 1550.
T1509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 421 US. 992 (1975).
'I ld. at 1309.
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ing technologies or which require the development of new technology, and
he is not limited to issuing standards based solely on devices already fully
developed."' 5 After noting this language, Comissioner Clearly pointed out
that the vinyl chloride standard considered in Society of Plastics sets forth an
abatement approach calling for implementation of those engineering and
"work practice controls" which can reduce exposure levels and, when the
controls are not fully sufficient, supplemental respiratory protection."6 This,
Commissioner Cleary noted, is an abatement approach much like that of the
noise standard. Thus any interpretation of the noise standard should reflect
cognizance, as in Society of Plastics, of the "technology-forcing characteristics" of the standard." The holding in Hodgson, relied upon in Chairman
Barnako's opinion, was dismissed by Cleary as inapposite since the asbestos
standard considered therein set forth various types of controls to be used and
was hence not truly technology-forcing in nature." Commissioner Cleary
concluded that the consideration of economic factors in the assessment of
feasibility, as established by the majority, would "vitiate the technologyforcing process implicit in the noise standard."' In his view, economics could
be considered in fashioning abatement schedules when an employer affirmatively establishes that compliance would create a hardship."' Commissioner

Cleary would have affirmed the citations.
Since the August 24, 1976, decision in Continental Can, several Commission decisions and one court of appeals decision" have followed the
Continental Can interpretation of feasibility. The decisions in Secretary of
Labor v. Castle & Cooke Foods,8" and Secretary of Labor v. Great Falls
Tribune Company,"' provide good examples of how the Commission has
applied the Continental Can test of economic feasibility.
The respondent in Castle & Cooke had been cited for failure to implement engineering controls to reduce noise levels at its can plant and in two
areas of its cannery. During peak periods up to 350 employees worked in
Ts Id.
6 3 0cc.

S~A,. & HEALTH CAs. (BNA) at 1550.
"TId. at 1551.
sId. at 1551-52.
T9 Id. at 1551.

so Commissioner Cleary would take cognizance of the need to accomplish costly abatement
of other more serious hazards such as carcinogens, by adjusting the pace at which noise
abatement would be required. Id. at 1552.
86The court of appeals decision which followed Continental Can was Turner v. Secretary
of Labor, 561 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1977).
82 OSAHRC Docket No. 10925, 5 0cC. SAP. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) 1435, [1977-1978] 00c.
SAP. & HEATH DEC. (CCH)
21,854 (May 19, 1977).
8 OSAHRC Docket No. 6632, 5 0cc. SAP. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) 1443, [1977-1978] Occ.

SAP. & HEAITH

DEC.

(CCH) 121,844 (May 19, 1977).
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the can plant while another twelve employees worked in the detached cannery building."' The parties stipulated that the employees in the cited areas
worked in close proximity to machinery which generated noise well in
excess of Table G-16 limits for eight hour shifts."' The parties also stipulated
that the respondent provided its employees with personal protective equipment that was usually used pursuant to company rules and which would
reduce noise to permissible levels when used.8 The consultants retained
by the respective parties agreed that machine enclosures would be the most
effective engineering means of attenuating the noise in the cited areas;
that the design, development, and installation of prototype controls for
each machine would require about two years to complete; and that approximately three more years would be required to manufacture and install the
final controls on each machine. Respondent's noise consultant concluded
that the enclosures would successfully reduce noise levels to the Table G-16
limits and obviate the necessity for personal protective equipment.
Labor's expert believed that substantial noise reductions would be
achieved by means of the enclosures, but he would not "guarantee" that
permissible limits could be reached. The cost of implementing the controls
over a five year period according to the calculations of the respondent's consultants would be $656,492 for the can plant and $40,886 for the cannery.
The total figure of $697,378 included estimated costs for "designing, fabricating, shipping, installing and checking prototypes for each type of
machine" as well as "modifying the prototypes, and fabricating, shipping,
and installing and checking" the final controls for each machine. Respondent's consultants further estimated that "annual production losses and increased maintenance costs" resulting from the engineering controls would
be $240,328 in the can plant and $1,338 in the cannery.87
After receiving the above evidence, the administrative law judge
vacated the noise citation on the grounds that it was unenforceably vague
and, alternatively, that Labor had failed to prove that "particular engineering
controls were available for immediate implementation."" The Commission
flatly rejected the judge's finding that the standard was unenforceably vague
" 5 0cc. Su. & HE.LT, CAs. (BNA) at 1435.
85

The decision reported that the noise levels were 89 to 101 dBA in most locations of the
can plant, and 95 to 96 dBA in the cannery. Id. at 1440.
86 Id.at 1436.
87 The cost per employee was also estimated:
Implementation Cost
Annual Cost Impact
Can Plant
$3,100
$1,100
Cannery
3,400
11
Id. at 1440.
8sId.at 1437.
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and reversed his holding to that effect."9 The Commission also reversed
the judge's alternative holding that feasible controls were not immediately
available and held that it was enough for Labor to show that technologically
feasible controls presently existed, even if it would take a number of
years for Respondent to adapt to them.9" The central issue was whether
or not Labor had sustained its burden of proving economic feasibility.
Respondent's main argument on the economic issue echoed the cost-benefit
analysis of Continental Can. Castle & Cooke argued that the cost of implementing the engineering controls was "grossly disproportionate to any
purported benefit," especially in light of the low cost of effective personal
protective equipment. 9 ' Labor argued that economic factors should be
considered on the question of feasibility only:
1. If the cost would so seriously jeopardize Respondent's condition as to
result in the probable shut-down of the establishment or;
2. If the increment of employee protection by the use of engineering
controls is insignificant and does not approach permissible limits while
the cost of the controls is so great as not to justify the imposition of
controls of marginal utility. 2
The second condition had not been mentioned in Continental Can. It
may have been added to Castle & Cooke in an attempt to support
Labor's assertion that its approach did indeed meet the requirements of
Hodgson that the Commission so heavily relied on in Continental Can.
Labor argued that Respondent would, at most, experience an adverse economic effect from the implementation of controls. The controls would
not result in their ceasing operation. Therefore Labor argued that the
economic feasibility tests were satisfied.93
In the lead opinion, Chairman Barnako criticized the approach of
both parties to the economic issue for their failure to focus on the degree
and type of hazard which the specified expenditures could eliminate." He
stated somewhat paradoxically:
[We do not think that a specific employer's economic situation is
particularly relevant in determining the feasibility of noise controls ....
Instead, we think that in determining whether controls are feasible, we

89

Id.

"Id.
91

Id.

Id.
98 Id.
" Id. at 1438-39.
92
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must realistically consider the hazard presented by excessive noise and
determine whether the health benefits to employees from noise reduction justify the cost to the employers. 5
Chairman Barnako then went on to compare noise hazards to carcinogens,
as he had done in Continental Can, and found that "excessive noise is not
life-threatening nor is it considered to be a serious health hazard within the
meaning of the Act, whereas other types of health hazards which may require
significant expenditures of funds to abate are life-threatening." 6 Since the
harm likely to result to the Respondent's employees is not great, Commissioner Barnako concluded that the large expenditure for engineering
controls as opposed to personal protective equipment is not justifiable."
Accordingly, the noise citation was vacated.
The lead opinion in Castle & Cooke is particularly illustrative of the
importance of relative hazard as a critical element in a cost-benefit analysis.
This notion was only suggested in Continental Can; the great emphasis
placed on this factor in Castle & Cooke serves to clarify the Continental
Can cost-benefit analysis.
Commissioner Moran's concurring opinion is significant in so far as it
differs from that of Chairman Barnako on the relevance of personal protective
equipment costs vis-a-vis engineering or administrative controls in a costbenefit analysis. Commissioner Moran stated that the proper measure of
economic feasibility should have been the "cost of such controls (engineering) in relation to the benefits they can be expected to produce over
the personal protective equipment in use." 8 The practical result of Chairman Barnako's approach was really no different than that of Commissioner
Moran's. However, Moran, unlike Barnako, took the position that personal
protective equipment could be used under the circumstances in Castle &
Cooke no less effectively than engineering controls for the protection of
employees. He apparently chose to disregard the factors of employee abuse
and nonuse noted in Continental Can and acknowledged by Chairman
Barnako in Castle & Cooke.
Commissioner Cleary's dissenting opinion took exception with the
majority's cost-benefit analysis. Most significantly, he suggested that consideration should have been given to a number of cost-benefit factors, including "the tax consequences of a capital expenditure by Respondent;
potential increased work by exposure to permissible noise; possible re95 Id.at 1438.
eld. at 1439.
01 Id. at 1440.

"Id.at 1441.
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duction in Respondent's expenditures in maintaining a hearing conservation
and monitoring program; possible reduction in premiums for workmen's
compensation insurance."99 Commissioner Cleary disagreed with the majority's assessment of the relative importance of protection against hearing
loss, describing the benefit as "not fully calculable in monetary terms. 10 0
He also suggested that consideration should be given to a number of adverse
effects other than hearing loss which result from excessive noise, noting
harmful changes in the functions of the endocrine, cardiovascular and
neurological systems. 101 In that regard, his dissent might be seen as a recommendation to Labor to present additional evidence on those medical effects
in future cases.
The decision in Secretary of Labor v. Great Falls Tribune Co., 0
which was rendered on the same day as Castle & Cooke, is instructive on
the issue of what proof is required to establish technological and economic
feasibility. The Great Falls Tribune Company published a daily newspaper.
In printing the newspaper it utilized a press room with five printing presses
and a folder. Four to eight employees worked as pressmen in the printing
room, operating the machinery for daily runs averaging three and one-half
hours but occasionally extending up to six hours. According to the engineering consultants of both parties, at normal operating speed the presses
generated noise levels of about 100 dBA. Respondent provided earmuffs
to the pressmen and required that they use them during printing operation.
The evidence established that the earmuffs were in fact regularly and properly worn and that they reduced the noise impact on the pressmen to permissible levels. As for engineering controls, Respondent presented the
testimony of a consultant who explained that sound absorbing panels could
be attached to the ends of each press and placed in the gaps between
presses, and that special buffers could also be installed. He also described
an enclosure which would reduce noise emanating from the folder. The
expert pointed out that these specific controls were being utilized in the
press room of the most technologically sophisticated newspaper in the state
and that they could be implemented at Respondent's facility for approximately $100,000 to $150,000 with a resultant reduction in the noise levels
from 100 dBA to 93.5 dBA. Based upon the effectiveness of the existing
personal protective program and the fact that the costly engineering controls
would not achieve full compliance with the noise standard, Respondent's
consultant concluded that the engineering controls were not feasible.'"
9 Id. at 1442.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1443.
102 5 Occ. SAP. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA)
108 Id. at 1444.

1443.
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Labor presented two witnesses on the feasibility issue, an industrial
hygienist and an acoustical engineer. The hygienist presented a number of
"general" methods for noise reduction including the coating of ceilings and
walls with sound absorbing material, the use of a "quiet booth," and the
construction of barricades around the machines. He did not specifically relate any of the available controls to the printing room in issue. The acoustical
engineer, on the other hand, did suggest that the enclosure of the presses,
the coating of the walls and the ceiling in the printing room with acoustical
material, and the use of a "quiet booth" (at which employees would be
stationed when it was not necessary for them to be in close proximity to
a press) were all controls which could feasibly reduce the noise in the
printing room in question. However, this witness admitted that his recommendations were based upon general knowledge of noise abatement techniques and not upon consideration of the specific conditions existing in the
printing room. Labor argued that proof of the availability of administrative
or engineering controls to reduce noise is sufficient to establish a prima
facie case and to shift the burden to the respondent to prove that the general techniques described are not feasible under the particular circumstances.
Labor's rationale was that since specific abatement methodologies are
discretionary with employers, it is sufficient to show that general noise controls exist. Labor should not be required to prove the feasibility of any
specific abatement program in order to establish a violation before the
Commission."'
This argument was rejected by the Commission. They held that the
"burden is not satisfied simply by a showing that general noise controls
exist. The standard is only violated if an employer fails to utilize those
controls which are feasible in its operations. Thus, the fact that general
noise control techniques exist does not establish that an employer violated
1 ' Chairman Barnako, who wrote the lead opinion, was
the standard.""
careful to point out that this holding did not mean that Labor was required
to prove the feasibility of a detailed abatement program, but only that
"some controls are feasible in an employer's plant." Accordingly, the
Commission rejected the testimony of Labor as to feasibility and considered
whether or not the testimony of Respondent's expert established that it
was feasible, technologically and economically, to reduce the noise through
engineering means. The Commission concluded that the predicted noise
reduction of 100 dBA to 93.5 dBA established technological feasibility
but that the benefits to be gained would be slight in comparison to the
104 Id. at 1445.
205 Id.
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cost."'8 The decision specifically noted that the average daily overexposure
of the pressmen was only one and one-half hours as they worked in an
atmosphere of 100 dBA for an average of three and one-half hours per
day, 7 and that even with the implementation of engineering controls, employees would be required to wear their earmuffs during some of the longer
press runs.' The Commission thus affirmed the administrative law judge's
decision vacating the noise citation.
Commissioner Cleary's dissent reiterated his position in Continental
Can. He concurred with the conclusion of the lead opinion that the proof
established noise levels at the pressroom that exceeded the Table G-16
limits and that technologically feasible controls existed to reduce the noise
by 6.5 dBA.' °9 This, Commissioner Cleary argued, was a fully sufficient
showing to establish a violation; he urged the majority to abandon the
additional economic factor applied pursuant to the Continental Can decision
and to consider economics only with respect to the abatement date." 0
In a footnote, Commissioner Cleary made one more point which may
have great significance."' In Continental Can the majority had accepted
a three dBA reduction as "clearly significant." Herein, the majority agreed
that the evidence showed a reduction of 6.5 dBA, yet considered it to be
"relatively slight." Commissioner Cleary found this holding to be "anomalous.""' 2 This conclusion is particularly noteworthy because the evidence
in Continental Can established that Continental Can employees were exposed to excessive noise (95 to 100 dBA) for eight hours per day, whereas
in Great Falls Tribune the employees were exposed to 100 dBA for an
average of three and one-half hours per day. Apparently Commissioner
Cleary, unlike Chairman Barnako, does not consider the period of overexposure under Table G-16 to be particularly important in assessing the
significance of the noise reduction to be accomplished by the engineering
controls in question. His footnote suggests that he would focus on the amount
of noise reduction alone in determining the significance of the noise reduction
in the process of assessing technological feasibility. Whether or not a reduction of less than three dBA would be significant to Commissioner Cleary
is not evident, however.
106

Id. at 1441.

Under Table G-16, employees may work in environments with dBA levels of 100 for up
to two hours per day without violating the standards.
107

108 3 0cc. SAF. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA)
109

Id. at 1447.

110

Id.

121

Id. at 1448, n.1O.

at 1446.

112 ld.
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The decision in Great Falls Tribune does much to amplify and clarify
the holding of Continental Can. On the specific issue of technological
feasibility, the decision makes it clear that simply showing the existence
of general controls for the reduction of noise is not sufficient for Labor
to establish technological feasibility; it must show that some particular controls will work in the respondent's plant."' As to the cost-benefit test, the
decision established that the duration of the exposure, as well as the level
of noise, will be carefully considered. Engineering controls will be assessed
not only in terms of the number of decibels by which they reduce noise, but
also by the number of hours of overexposure which they eliminate. Despite
his strong dicta in Continental Can to the effect that personal hearing protection is inherently undesirable for noise control, the attention which Chairman Barnako paid to the use and effectiveness of earmuffs suggests that in
his cost-benefit analysis he is very seriously considering the effectiveness of
personal hearing protection and whether it will continue to be required
following the implementation of engineering controls.
It is clear, upon reviewing Continental Can, Castle & Cooke, and Great
Falls Tribune, that Labor's burden of proof for establishing a violation of
the noise standard is considerable. Secretary of Labor v. Louisiana-Pacific
Corp.,"" provides the sole example" 5 of the type of proof which the Commission"' will find sufficient to establish feasibility, both technologically
and economically.
Labor's evidence on feasibility in Louisiana-Pacific was presented
through the testimony of a noise control consultant that was qualified by the
administrative law judge as an expert witness. 1" The expert presented a
detailed explanation of two methods by which he believed Respondent's
lumber mill chipper machine, which was the source of the noise condition
in issue, could be decreased from the 144 to 122 dBA level, to 90 dBA
'Li See also, Secretary of Labor v. West Point Pepperell Inc., OSAHRC Docket No. 8255,
5 Occ. SAF. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) 1257, [1977-1978] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH)
121,751 (April 18, 1977).
114 5 0cc. SAF. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) 1994.
215 In Secretary v. Wheeling Corrugating Company, OSAHRC Docket No. 13286, 6 0cc.
SAF. & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) 1161, [1977-1978] Occ. SAP. & HEALTH CAS. (CCH)
20,360 (November 28, 1977), the Commissioner affirmed an administrative law judge's
ruling on the issue of economic feasibility and the Commission therefore did not consider
the issue.
lie At the time of Louisiana-Pacificthe Commission consisted only of Commissioners Barnako
and Cleary. Commissioner Moran's term expired on April 27, 1977.
III The decision reveals that Respondent's expert did not have any specialized training in
noise control and had not received any degrees; his involvement with noise control primarily
consisted of some experimentation in the reduction of noise generated by planers. 5 0cc.
SAP. & HEALTH CA& (BNA) at 2000.
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for the daily seven hour shifts." 8 The consultant based his opinion upon
an on site examination of the lumber mill in question and upon his knowledge
of the use of the abatement controls recommended at other lumber facilities. 19 He first described a plan for the construction of a barrier which
would provide an "acoustical shadow" for the operator."' He explained that
the barrier would be fabricated of sound absorbing material and that a
special door would be built into the barrier to allow operator access to the
equipment and visual examination of the shielded equipment. He then
described how an enclosure for the chipper infeed chute, from which much
of the noise was transmitted, could also be designed and installed so that
the noise would be blocked. Again, he explained how access of lumber
to the infeed chute would remain possible through modifications in the
enclosure including vision panels and neophrene strips for the infeeding of
lumber. The consultant estimated the time for installation of the recommended controls to be eight to twelve weeks at the cost of $3,000 to
$5,000.11
Respondent attempted to rebut this evidence through a witness who,
unlike Labor's expert, had no special training in noise control but had "experimented" with noise enclosures on the respondent's planer machines on
a few occasions while employed as the company's safety director. This witness was unable to present any evidence that conflicted with the cost estimates of Labor's expert and his attack on the feasibility of the proposed controls apparently did little more than suggest possibilities of interference with
the production process. 22 Labor's expert was able to recommend modifications to accommodate the hypothetical problems, thereby diluting Respondent's arguments. 2 Respondent's witness admitted that he once installed an
enclosure on a chipper at a cost of $9,000 with a resultant noise reduction
of 22 dBA thereby corroborating Labor's case on technological feasibility
to some extent. 2"
The lead opinion in Louisiana-Pacific, written by Chairman Cleary,
concluded without much elucidation that Labor's evidence "clearly established a prima facie case of technological and economic feasibility."'2' It is
interesting that Chairman Cleary used the phrase "economic feasibility" at
118 Id.

Id.
Id. at 1997.
121 Id.
1
2 Id.at 2000.
128 Id. at 2001.
124 Id. at 2000.
125 Id.
219
120

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol12/iss1/7

22

Parashes: OSHA Noise Standard
Sum~mer, 1978]

OSHA Nomss STANuDAR

all, as he had argued in Continental Can and Great Falls Tribune that
economics are not part of the test for feasibility. The one factor which he
emphasized on the proof of feasibility was that Labor's expert witness had
a much more impressive background in noise control than Respondent's.
He also mentioned in that regard, that qualified experts could establish feasibility based upon opinions stated in terms of their "best professional judgment," even if that judgment were admittedly less than 100% certain. 2 '
In his concurring opinion Commissioner Barnako first agreed, with
little elaboration, that the evidence established technological feasibility of
noise reduction.12 " He pointed out that the noise levels in issue, 114 to 122
dBA, are extremely hazardous and even fully effective personal hearing protection might not adequately protect an employee working in the presence
of those levels. 12 8 Because of the severity of the hazard, the cost of $3,000
to $5,000, or even $9,000 using Respondent's evidence, "would be fully
justified to achieve a significant noise reduction."'12
It is interesting to note that in this decision Chairman Cleary wrote
the leading opinion without attacking or challenging the element of economics as part of feasibility, while Commissioner Bamako analyzed costs
and benefits without consideration of many of the factors he addressed in
Continental Can. Such factors included the costs of maintaining the controls,
the indirect costs resulting from any loss in productivity, and the number
of workers exposed. The reason he ignored these may simply have been that
in this particular case the noise levels were exceptionally high while the
installation costs were not likely to significantly strain even a company
of moderate size. 1 0 The decision in Louisiana-Pacificsuggests that the Commissioners are willing to relax their approach to the issue of feasibility to some
extent when the facts clearly show a serious noise condition which can be
corrected for a moderate cost. The decision at least illustrates one set of
facts which both commissioners agree establishes a violation of the noise
standard by showing that noise levels have exceeded the Table G-16
limits and that engineering controls are available which are feasible, technologically and economically, for the substantial reduction of noise levels.
126

Id. at 2001,n.18.

127 Id. at 2003.
128

Id. n.2. Commissioner Barnako noted that earplugs achieve a maximum attenuation of

approximately 27 dBA. Thus a noise level of 122 dBA could be reduced to no lower than

95 dBA which is still excessive for a seven hour period.
129 Id.

There is no discussion in the decision of any specific facts such as annual dollar volume
or number of employees, which would indicate the actual size of the Louisiana-Pacific
Corporation.
1s0
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CONCLUSION

It is clear from the Commission decisions that Commissioners Cleary
and Barnako essentially agree on the type of evidence which Labor must
present in order to prove that Table G-16 limits have been exceeded, and
when it is technologically feasible to reduce excessive noise levels. Those
decisions which allow for proof of excessive noise by "spot readings" and
indirect evidence of employee exposure, and which allow for proof of technological feasibility through evidence that "some controls" exist to reduce
noise in the plant in question, are not likely to undergo changes in the near
future as to the aforementioned elements of the noise standard. The element
which must still be more clearly defined and settled, is that of economic
feasibility.
As the decision in Louisiana-Pacificillustrates, Commissioners Barnako
and Cleary have been able to concur in a case involving the noise standard
when the facts reveal that the costs of implementing controls are clearly
low and the benefits clearly high. However, their concurrence can be seen
as an effort to avoid rendering a split decision which would have no procedential value. Now that a full Commission is sitting once again, the Commissioners will not be so compelled to subordinate the more picayune distinctions in their interpretations of feasibility in order to reach a decision
with precedential value. It is highly predictable that in the near future the
full Commission will consider a noise case in the manner of ContinentalCan
'o Castle & Cooke and finally settle the Commission law on the role of
economics in the application of the noise standard.
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